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Do Hitters Boost Their Performance 
During Their Contract Years? 
Evidence from the 2006- 11 Collective Bargaining Agreement's Years Says "Yes" 
Heather M. O'Neill, PhD 
E
ach season, baseball fans and journalists alike 
identify which players are in the final years of 
their contracts because a lot rides on how the 
players produce in their "contract year." Will a player 
boost his effort and performance in an effort to improve 
his value and bargaining power? Or will he crumble 
under the pressure? Or are players' performances un-
correlated with where they stand in their contract 
cycles? Legendary manager Sparky Anderson believed 
players rose to the occasion in their contract years de-
claring, "Just give me 25 guys on the last year of their 
contract; I'll win a pennant every year. "1 Although an-
ecdotal evidence abounds, this paper uses a robust data 
sPt .:ind appropriate player-specific econometric model-
ing highlighted in O'Neill to show that Anderson was 
right- players' performances improve during their con-
tract years. 2 To find the answer requires following 
players throughout their careers to tease out changes 
predicated on contract status, rather than comparing 
players to one another given their contract status. 
For example, in the last year of a three-year contract 
with the Mariners in 2006, Raul Ibanez sported an .869 
OPS (on-base plus slugging percentage), up from .792 
OPS the previous year.3 He subsequently signed an $11 
million, two-year contract with tl1e Mariners. In his next 
contract year, 2008, his OPS of .837 slightly exceeded 
his 2007 OPS of .831. Ibanez then signed a $31.5 million, 
three-year contract with the Phillies. At the end of that 
deal, in 2011, lbaiiez's .707 OPS dipped lower than his 
previous year's OPS of .793 and the Yankees signed hjm 
to a one-year deal at $1.1 million. Two of Ibaiiez's three 
contract years show boosts in performance, while the 
third demonstrates a significant drop. He was also 39 
years old in 2011, suggesting age must be accounted for 
while searching for the answer. 
The parties in contract negotiations- players, 
agents, and team owners-understand that incentives 
affect performance and that performance impacts pay 
and contract length. Players seek job security, income, 
and championships, while profit-seeking owners want 
78 
players to perform well to win games and champi-
onships and secure fan enthusiasm. In contract 
negotiations, how a player has performed over his ca-
reer serves as an imperfect predictor of his future 
performance. If players believe that team owners 
weigh a player's most recent season more heavily than 
preceding years, it sets the stage for the contract year 
phenomenon. The attraction of a lucrative future con-
tract provides ample incentive for a player to put in 
additional time and effort to boost performance in his 
contract year. After signing a new guaranteed contract, 
both pay and contract length are set regardless of 
actual performance, which removes the previous in-
centive.4 For longer-term contracts, this may lead to 
shirking. Eventually, a new contract year arrives and 
the incentive to boost performance reappears. 
Difficulty arises in separating the individual per-
formance of a baseball player from his team's 
capabilities. This proves especially true for pitchers 
since decisions made about their pitch selection, pitch 
location, and strategy may depend on their team's 
fielding proficiency and the strength of the bullpen. 
For a hitter, ilie type of pitch he sees may depend in 
part on the hitters adjacent to him in the lineup and 
the situation. This paper analyzes individual data on 
hitters (position players), railier than pitchers, while 
cognizant of the potential measurement errors. Ad-
justed OPS (OPS 100) serves as the measure of the 
hitter's performance. Although random variations in 
OPSlOO from one year to ilie next can occur, it is un-
likely for a large group of players that above average 
performances would randomly occur during contract 
years. I contend that effort and performance change 
from one year to the next depending upon where the 
player sits in his contract cycle. 
Major League Baseball's use of salary arbitration, 
contract extensions, and free agency provides avenues 
for enhanced contract conditions for players. This 
paper focuses on free agents with six or more years of 
MLB service for the following four reasons: 
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(l) free agency is associated with the greatest 
financial gains for players as teams bid for 
players' services; 
(2) al least sLx years uf service eual.Jle more ol.J-
servations per player to capture more robust 
results; 
(3) free agents with fewer than six years are 
those who have been demoted to the minors 
or released; and 
(4) there will be a sufficient number of players 
who may retire at the end of their contract 
year, an intention that is expected to impact 
contract year performance. 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Previous research on MLB contract year performance 
shows mixed results. As detailed in O'Neill, the choice 
of performance measure and statistical technique em-
ployed often create contradictory results.5 Researchers 
generally analyze hitters, believing hitting statistics are 
less contaminated by team play than pitching statis-
tics. The use of slugging percentage (SLG), at bats 
(ABs), days on the disabled list (DL). wins above re-
placement player, OPS, and runs created per 27 outs 
(R27), show the range of offensive performance meas-
ures investigated. Given differences in players' 
abilities, changes in a player's output should be rela-
tive to his ability, indicating why several studies use 
the deviation between current and three-year moving 
average of a player's offensive statistics to capture 
changes in a player's output. A deviation-based model 
by Maxcy et al. finds no significant change in SLG for 
players in their contract year.6 Maxcy et al. does find 
that players seeking new contracts spend fewer days 
on the DL and have more ABs, contending they do so 
to make themselves more attractive to team owners. 
Birnbaum does not find a boost in R27 during contract 
years, whereas Perry does using WARP_7.s 
Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression en-
ables one to predict changes in output during the 
contract year while controlling for observable player 
traits, such as age, years of MLB experience, team suc-
cess, etc. However, compiling data on many players 
(cross sectional data) over several years played (lime 
series dataJ creates a "panel" dataset. OLS estimation 
leads to biased results with panel data. Previous stud-
ies show robust statistical evidence of the contract year 
boost when using appropriate panel data estimation 
techniques, whereas those applying OLS models do not, 
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as discussed in O'Neill.9 Analyzing data on hitters be-
tween 2001 and 2004, Dinerstein uses seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) and finds statistically signif-
icant increases in a hitter's SLG during his contract 
year.10 Interestingly, from the ream owners· perspectives, 
Dinerstein finds that consistency of a player's perform-
ance mattered more than the most recent performance. 
If teams are seeking consistency, they will pay for it, 
and players will begin to aim for steady hitting per-
formances. If Dinerstein is correct, we should see a 
reduction toward zero in the magnitude of the contract 
year boost. Hummel and O'Neill employ fixed effects 
estimation with data on free agents playing 2004- 08 
and find 4.2-5.5 percent boosts in OPS during contract 
years. 11 They note that players intending to retire no 
longer have financial incentive to boost effort, although 
they may desire to go out on top. Their results suggest 
the former effect dominates, shown by an 11.2- 13.2 per-
cent decrease in OPS for retiring players in the last year 
of their contracts, after controlling the diminishment of 
performance due to age and age-related injury. 
ABILITY, EFFORT, AND PERFORMANCE 
Team owners and general managers observe differ-
ences in players' performances through easily 
available statistics. The rlifference hetween inn;:ite ;ihil-
ity and effort, however, which together account for the 
differences in players' performances, proves difficult 
to discern. In a given year, a player's ability generally 
remains relatively constant, but his effort can change 
and lead to differences in perfonnance levels. While 
unlikely that effort changes much during a game, off-
season effort and effort between games in-season can 
vary. Players can exert effort to enhance their produc-
tivity by engaging in more intense workouts, restricted 
leisure activities, and eating healthier diets. 
Players alter their effort when their interest dic-
tates. If players believe team owners place greater 
weights on more recent performances, this motivates 
players to increase their effort and (ideally) perform-
ance during their contract year. But if players perceive 
that owners value consistent performance, then boost-
ing performance in the contract year remains unlikely. 
When a player intends to retire at the end of the con-
tract cycle, the incentive to perform and acquire 
another contract disappears, which is expected to re-
duce effort and performance during all years of the 
final contract, including the last year. 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL TO ESTIMATE ADJUSTED 
ON BASE PLUS SLUGGING PERCENTAGE 
The dependent variable for this study is OPSlOO, 
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preferred over OPS because it accounts for league play 
and the player's home baseball park. This offensive 
measure accounts for power and reaching base fre-
quently, two events contributing to scoring runs. 
OPSlOO uue:; uol tlepentl upon playing time and cap-
tures offensive prowess better than RBis, batting 
average, HRs, etc. 12 Albert and Bennett find OPS a bet-
ter predictor of scoring runs than its two components 
separately. 13 Barry Bonds holds the single-season 
record for unadjusted OPS at 1.4217 in 2004 when his 
SLG was .812 and his OBA was .609.14 During that sea-
son he typically walked or hit a home run during a 
plate appearance. 
The suggested regression model for OPS 100 for 
player i in season tis (formula 1) 
(+I (+) (+J 1-l 
sign a new contract. He may willingly choose to retire, 
retire reluctantly due to advanced age or injuries, or be 
forced to retire because no team is willing to hire him 
despite his desire to keep playing. Unfortunately, it is 
. not feasible to know which case prevails for all players. 
The variable NOPLAY = 1 denotes a player is not on a 
MLB team the year after a contract year and NO-
PLAY = 0 indicates he is on a roster. If NOPLAY switches 
from 0 to l because a player willingly chooses to retire, 
the expected impact is a decrease in OPSIOO due to the 
Jack of incentive to sign another contract. If NOPLAY 
switches for one of the other reasons for retirement, it 
may be due to a low OPSlOO, in which case the impact 
of NOPLAY on OPS100 is biased. To mitigate the 
bias and introduce the potential reasons behind retire-
ment-advanced age, injuries, and poor 
OPSI00.1 = ~ + 131* GAMES.,1+131* Pl.AYOFfr1+13l* PROBRETi1 + j3i• COl'flRACTYR,, performance-a new variable that predicts 
the likelihood of retirement is created, PRO-
BRET, following work by Krautmann and 
Solow. 17 The estimated probability of retire-
where: GAMES represents the number of games 
played; PLAYOFF is a binary variable equal to l when 
the player's team makes the playoffs and O otherwise; 
PROBRET is the estimated probability of retirement; 
and CONTRACTYR is a dummy variable denoting 
whPthPr sp;:ison t is ;:i contract year ( = 1) or not ( = O). 
The sign above each coefficient denotes the expected 
impact on OPSIOO given an increase in the independ-
ent variable, holding all else constant. The stochastic 
error comprises two terms impacting a player's 
performance: ai is the unobserved player effect repre-
senting all time-invariant factors that cannot be 
measured or observed, such as innate ability, work 
ethic, drive, etc.; and µi,t represents random errors, 
due to accidents, weather, etc_ 15 
The GAMES and PLAYOFF variables serve as con-
trol variables to mitigate potential bias. Playing more 
games helps a player gain confidence at the plate, 
likely raising his OPSlOO. Similarly, players with higher 
OPSIOO statistics likely play in more games. The ex-
pected positive association between OPS 100 and 
GAMES implies ~l > 0. Several reasons suggest ~2 > 0. 
Jf a player's team is in the playoff hunt, he is expected 
to boost his performance to help his team make the 
playoffs and potentially win a championship. Teams 
in a playoff race may trade for high performing hitters 
at the trade deadline, suggesting another reason for the 
positive association. A financial incentive to perform 
better also exists, since team members earn playoff 
revenues. Lastly, higher OPSIOO figures may lead to 
teams making the playoffs. 16 
At the end of a player's contract, he may or may not 
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ment, discussed and shown later, is used to predict the 
retirement intention for each player for each year. Using 
PROBRET instead of NOPLAY as an independent vari-
able reduces bias. Players who choose to retire do not 
seek another contract, therefore are expected to have a 
lower OPSIOO_ Additionally, a player with a low OPSIOO 
is more likely to have a higher probability of retirement 
as he goes unsigned or reluctantly hangs up his cleats. 
These suggest B3 < 0. 
MLB hitters are expected to engage in opportunistic 
behavior and increase their performance during the 
contract year, thus B4 > o_ This presumes team owners 
value the most recent performance as a solid indicator 
of future performance, making way for the contract year 
boost. CONTRACTYR is the only independent variable 
in (1) that satisfies causal inference, rather than simply 
correlation, since a player's contract status is known 
a priori. 
DATA 
Data are collected on all free agent hitters playing dur-
ing the most recently completed 2006-11 Collective 
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) who had six or more years 
of MLB experience, a minimum of two years of obser-
vation, and played in at least seven games in a year. 
Choosing players under the same CBA helps reduce po-
tential impacts due to changes in CBAs, since all players 
and team owners are subject to the same contract and 
free agency guidelines, and revenue-sharing rules. 18 
Signing new local and national TV contracts also affect 
revenue-sharing streams and hence salaries, but these 
are not captured in the data set. 
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Hitters with one-year and longer-term contracts are 
used. Players with longer term contracts generally rep-
resent those with higher ability; eliminating those with 
one-year contraccs would potentially bias the results.19 
Ultimately, 256 MLB free agent hitters meet the data 
selection criteria. The panel dataset is unbalanced, 
meaning the number of observations per player need 
not be the same. 
ESPN.com's Major League Baseball Free Agent 
Tracker lists the positions played, age, current team 
and new team unless re-signed, for all free agents in 
each year. Players who do not receive another contract 
are listed as retired or free agent again. Baseball-Ref-
erence.com provides OPSlOO statistics, the number of 
games played each season, and the year in which a 
player debuted in the major leagues. Josh Herrnsmeyer 
unselfishly provided me with the number of days on 
the disabled list (DL) for all players in 2006-09 from 
his MLB Injury Report. Backseat Fan (2010) and Fan-
Graphs (20ll) provide the days on the disabled list for 
players in 2010 and 2011, respectively. For players who 
change teams via an in-season trade, the playoff status 
of the final team is used. 
Table 1 presents the format of the unbalanced data 
set for two players. The first player is outfielder (PO-
SITION= 9) Bobby Abreu, given ;in irlentific;ition c:orlP 
of 2, who was 32 years old in 2006. Abreu appears on 
MLB rosters in all six years of the 2006-2011 CSA and 
with the Dodgers in 2012, thus NOPLAY = O for all of 
his years. In his 2008 contract year and prior year, he 
played with the Yankees, having been traded from the 
Phillies in 2006. The Yankees made the playoffs in 
2006 and 2007 but not in 2008, shown by PLAYOFF = 1 
and 0, respectively. In 2007, Abreu shows an OPSlOO 
of 113 playing in 158 games, compared to his OPSlOO 
of 120 in 156 games in his 2008 contract year. Abreu 
debuted in the majors in 1996, implying 11 years of ex-
perience (EXP) by 2006. With no days on the DL over 
the six years, DL= 0. 
Table 1. Unbalanced Dataset Example . 
Moises Rojas Alou signed 
as a free agent with the 
San Francisco Giants be-
fore the 2005 season, and 
with the Mets before the 
2007 season. He would 
play 2007 and 2008 with 
the Mets. 
Bobby Abreu moved mid-season in 2006 from the Phillies to the 
Yankees by trade, then went to the Angels in 2009 as a free agent. 
NAME CODE YR YEAR TEAM AGE CON TY EAR OPS100 GAMES POSITlm NOPLA~ EXP PLAYOFF DL 
Bobby.tlbreu 2 1 2006 Phll/Yank 32 0 126 156 9 0 11 1 0 
Bobby.tlbreu 2 2 2007 Yank 33 0 113 158 9 0 12 1 0 
Bobby Abreu 2 3 2008 Yank 34 1 120 156 9 0 13 0 0 
Bobby.tlbreu 2 4 2009 Anael JS 0 118 152 9 0 14 1 0 
Bobby.tlbreu 2 s 2010 An11el 36 0 118 lS4 9 0 15 0 0 
Bobby.tlbreu 2 6 2011 Anul 37 0 105 142 9 0 16 0 0 
Moises Alou 4 l 2006 Giant 39 1 132 98 9 0 17 0 so 
Moises Alou 4 2 2007 Mets 40 0 137 87 9 0 18 0 76 
Moises Alou 4 3 2008 Mets 41 1 107 15 9 1 i9 0 163 
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The second player, outfielder Moises Alou, shows 
two contract years, in 2006 with the San Francisco 
Giants and in 2008 with the New York Mets. He had 15 
years of MLB experience by 2006 at age 39. Alou did 
not play on a MLB learn iu 2009, thus NOPLAY= 1 fur 
2008. His teams did not make the playoffs in any of 
the three years. Injuries led to increasing numbers of 
days on the DL and fewer games played between 2006 
and 2007, and by 2008 two major injuries limit Alou's 
playing time to only 15 games with 163 days on the 
DL. Three observations for Alou and six for Abreu in-
dicate an unbalanced dataset. 
Sorting the descriptive statistics by contract year 
status, interesting results appear in Table 2. The dif-
ferences in means for all variables, except playoffs and 
days on the DL, are statistically significantly different 
at p < .001. There are 546 player-year observations for 
contract years and 470 for non-contract years. The 
average OPSlOO for the contract year is 85.9 compared 
to 97 .2 for the non-contract year, which appears con-
trary to the contract year boost hypothesis. This 
contrary result arises chiefly from the ex-post retire-
ments (NOPLAY = 1) of 23.1 percent in the contract 
year observations swamping the 3.2 percent in the 
non-contract year that may be due to poorer hitters re-
ceiving only one year contracts. Ten fewer average 
games played in the contract year observations also 
suggests that less capable hitters have shorter con-
tracts. Comparing the two means proves misleading 
and too simplistic. Predicting OPSlOO via appropriate 
regression analysis can account for the influence of re-
tirement and other factors to offer a more robust test 
of the contract year phenomenon. 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES VERSUS FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
Given panel data, estimation of the model via ordinary 
least squares (OLS) may be inappropriate due to omit-
ted variable bias that occurs when immeasurable 
player characteristics in the error term a; are correlated 
with some independent variables. For example, a 
player's ability, captured in ai, is expected to be posi-
tively correlated with the number of games he plays, 
GAMES, since higher ability players are likely to play 
in more games. Suppose higher ability players do have 
higher OPSlOOs and that playing in more games does 
increase OPSlOO. Ignoring the influence of ability, as in 
the case of OLS, means that GAMES receives more 
credit than warranted as the cause of the high OPSlOO. 
Consequently, the estimated coefficient of l will be 
positively biased. Similarly, if a player has an excep-
tional (albeit non-measurable) work ethic, he will 
likely contribute more to his team success and increase 
his team's chances of making the playoffs. This im-
plies an expected positive correlation between a; and 
PLAYOFF. If high OPSlOOs are attributable to both 
strong work ethics and playing on a playoff team, then 
the estimated coefficient of 2 will also be positively 
biased in OLS.20 Eliminating bias requires a different 
technique, namely fixed effects (FE) estimation. 
Studying a player's motivation to perform across the 
contract cycle suggests concentrating on the within-
player behavior. Estimating how each player alters his 
effort and performance over his contract cycle must be 
measured against his metrics, not against those of oth-
ers. FE estimation calculates the mean of each variable 
over time for each player and subtracts it from the ac-
tual observation for each year to demean the data. For 
example, Bohhy Ahre11's .werage OPSlOO over his six 
years of playing is 116.5, which is subtracted from his 
actual OPSlOO for each of his six years to yield six 
deviations or demeaned observations for his OPSlOO. 
After doing so for all players, the demeaned dependent 
variable of OPSIOO is regressed on the demeaned inde-
pendent variables via OLS producing the fixed 
effects within-player coefficients. Time-invariant unob-
served traits in ai, such as ability, have demeaned values 
of zero, eliminating them from affecting outcomes. 
Dropping out the unobserved traits via demeaning elim-
inates correlations and associated biases between 
unobserved traits and independent variables.21 
While FE estimation addresses bias and focuses on 
changes in players' behaviors, it comes with a cost. 
Finding statistical significance for estimated coeffi-
cients may be compromised. The variation in OPSIOO 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Contract Year versus Non-Contract Year 
CONTRACT YEAR NON-CONTRACT YEAR 
N MEAN ST. DEV. MINIMUM MAXIM UN N MEAN ST. DEV. MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
OPS100 546 85.9 30.41 -21 182 470 97.2 29.87 -39 192 
NOPLAY 5'6 0 .231 Q_42 0 1 470 0.032 0.18 0 1 
AGE 546 33.59 3.28 26 48 470 32.25 3.02 24 47 
DL 546 19.39 33.74 0 163 470 17.53 31.99 0 193 
EXP 546 11.6 3.29 7 26 470 10.6 3 6 25 
PLAYOFF 546 0.333 0.47 0 1 470 0.309 0.46 0 1 
GAMES 546 95.23 ..0.57 7 162 470 115.49 36.88 10 162 
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across 256 players is expected to be much greater than 
the variation in OPSIOO for individual players over 
their free agency careers. For example, the dataset 
shows a range in OPSlOO from -39 to 192 with a stan-
dard deviation of 30.67, while Bobby Abreu·s only 
vary between 105 and 126 with a 7.09 standard devi-
ation. Other players generally have smaller OPSlOO 
deviations too. Since FE estimation concentrates on 
the within-player variation and dismisses the between-
player differences in OPSlOO, it reduces the sample 
variation in OPSlOO and lessens the likelihood of sta-
tistical significance for the estimated coefficients. 
Demeaning the data also reduces the degrees of free-
dom by 255, further diminishing chances of statistical 
significance. Therefore, finding a statistically signifi-
cant FE result for 4, in spite of these perils, occurs 
because evidence from the dataset is compelling. 
ESTIMATING THE PROBABILITY OF RETIRING 
Players generally retire at the end of a contract. How-
ever, the predicted probability of retiring can change 
over time until actual retirement occurs and it should 
be considered by the team owner during negotiations. 
A player's likelihood of retiring depends on how many 
years he has played, how many days have been spent 
on the DL, and his offensive performance per Kraut-
mann and Solow.ii Equation (2) denotes the regression 
equation for the probability of retirement for player i in 
season t as (formula 2) 
Players with more years of experience are expected 
to have increasingly greater likelihoods of retiring 
since they have signed several contracts and amassed 
income. Additionally, the aging process that accompa-
nies years of experience takes its toll on bodies often 
coinciding with familial demands to be home more 
often. With EXP2 representing years of experience 
squared, a1 > 0 and az > 0 are expected. More days on 
the DL are expected to increase PRO BRET, i.e., al> 0, 
since injuries inhibit playing ability and reduce inter-
est by team owners. If a decline in OPS 100 portends 
reduced future performance, it increases retirement 
likelihood, a4 < 0. The stochastic error comprises both 
the unobserved time-invariant player traits ai and un-
measured time-variant traits Vt such as family issues. 
Using NOPLAY as the dependent variable, estimat-
ing (2) via FE leads to the linear probability model (3) 
below. Since NOPLAY is determined after the season, 
all of the independent variables yield causal inference. 
The p-values for one-tailed hypotheses tests for the es-
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timated slope coefficients are in parentheses below the 
estimates. (formula 3) 
PROBRET = -3.38 + .l57*EXP + .ooo·EXPl + .ooo4•DL- .004*0PS100 
(.0475) (.0001) (.135) (.001) 
C0trettly Predicted= 94%" 
Days on the disabled list do not statistically predict 
likelihood of retiring, but remaining variables do. Each 
additional year of MLB experience increases the likeli-
hood of retiring exponentially and a one point increase 
in OPSlOO reduces it the probability of retirement by .4 
percent . Since the -3.38 intercept pertains to the last 
player's last year, the predicted output for al! players 
for all years occur as changes from -3.38. For brevity, 
they are not provided. For example, Bobby Abreu 
could have retired after his 2008 contract year, but his 
predicted probability was .001 (near zero) and he did 
not retire.24 His likelihood rose to 1.5 percent in 2009 
due to his two point decrease in OPSlOO and extra year 
of experience. By 2010, despite no change in his 
OPSlOO from 2009, the additional year playing leads 
to a probability of 12.7 percent. In 2011, his sixteenth 
year in the majors and drop in OPSlOO to 104 increases 
his likelihood to 33 percent. For Moises Alou the 
model predicted a 60 percent chance of retirement fol-
lowing his 2008 season, when he did in fact retire. The 
predicted values of PROBRET for all 1, 106 observations 
are calculated and ultimately used to estimate (1). 
RESULTS FROM ESTIMATING OPSl 00 
Regression model (1) derives from two im-
provements in the model estimated in 
O'Neill.25 First, traditional theory suggests that 
as players age, their offensive performance increases at 
a decreasing rate as they become more comfortable in 
hitting, until it peaks, and eventually declines as age 
depreciates hitting skills. O'Neill includes the quad-
ratic form of age, AGE and AGE squared, as 
independent variables impacting OPSlOO. Additionally, 
O'Neill's PROBRET estimation employs performance, 
injury, and the quadratic form of years of experience in 
place of age. O'Neill finds the odd result that OPSlOO 
increases at an increasing rate after age 33. Having age 
enter PROBRET through its correlation with years of 
experience, and then using PROBRET along with age 
in predicting OPSlOO, may have led to that usual re-
sult. Second, O'Neill segregated catchers and 
shortstops as defensive players, believing that they 
sport lower OPSlOO statistics in exchange for better de-
fensive play. However, since FE estimation demeans 
the data and players who are shortstops or catchers 
generally do not change positions, it does not seem ap-
propriate to segregate them. 
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The 1,016 player-year observations yielding equa-
tion (4) presents the FE multiple regression equation 
for predicted OPSlOO (OPSlOO") with one-tailed p-val-
ues in parenthesis.26 The Buse-R2 indicates that 78 
pen:eul uf the varialim1 i11 adjusted OPS is explained 
by the model with these independent variables.27 
Games played and being on a playoff team indicate the 
expected positive sign, but they are not statistically sig-
nificant at 5 percent.(formula 4) 
OPSIOO" = 114.52 + .WGAMES + .60•PlAYOFF- 100.34APROBRET + 
(.091) (.321) (.0001) 
+ 6.11 • CONTRACTYR R2=.78 
(.0001) 
The highly significant PROBRET coefficient says that 
a one percentage point increase in the likelihood of re-
tiring reduces expected adjusted OPS by 1.0034 points 
or 1.1 percent decline relative to the mean OPS 100 of 
91.12. A 10 percentage point increase in the likelihood 
of retiring, about one half standard deviation in PRO-
BRET, reduces predicted adjusted OPS by 10.034 points. 
The estimated model provides evidence of the con-
tract year phenomenon, but the phenomenon depends 
upon the likelihood of retirement. If a player is in a 
contract year, holding all else constant, the expected 
incrPase in his arljnstPrl OPS is 6.11 points or 6. 7 pPr-
cent increase relative to the mean. But for two 
otherwise identical players, one in his contract year 
and the other not, the expected OPSlOO for the former 
is 6.11 points higher. Using the Grossman heuristic that 
every .100 increase in OPS raises salary by $2,000,000 
and converting OPS to OPSlOO enables monetizing the 
6.11 bump. 2s The contract year boost is expected to in-
crease annual salary by $470,000, about 15.2 percent 
of the average salary of $3 .1 million in 2011. 
The impact from the likelihood of retiring offsets 
the contract year boost. Each additional percentage 
point increase in a contract year player's retirement 
probability reduces the 6.11 boost by l.0034. A com-
plete offset of no expected change in OPSlOO during 
the contract year occurs with a jump in retirement like-
lihood of about 6.1 (6.11/1.0034) points. With years 
of experience driving retirement likelihood exponen-
tially, a decline in expected OPSlOO reasonably appears 
at the end of contracts for players with many years of 
experience. For instance, a 10-point increase in the 
probability of retirement leads to a 3.9 (6.11-10.034) 
decline in expected OPSlOO during a contract year. 
CONCLUSIONS 
By using FE estimation to account for changes in each 
player's behavior and reducing bias due to unobserved 
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player traits pervasive with OLS estimation, the data 
show strong support for the contract year boost. From 
FE estimation, two important contract year findings 
follow. First, the adjusted OPS of a free agent hitter in 
his contract year is expected to be 6. 7 percent greater 
than in non-contract year periods-higher than previ-
ously noted studies. Second, "retiring" players show a 
decline in their contract year performance and any 
models which ignore retirement will be misspecified. 
OLS estimation of the same dataset (not shown) yields 
a negative impact on OPSlOO during the contract year, 
albeit not statistically significant. This biased result co-
incides with the contrary findings in Table 2 that show 
lower average OPSlOO for contract year observations 
than non-contract year observations. 
The model may prove helpful during contract ne-
gotiations as one can compare a hitter's actual 
performance relative to expectations. Take Albert Pu-
jols as an example. In 2008 and 2009, his OPSlOO 
statistics of 192 and 189 greatly exceeded his predicted 
statistics of 175 and 176, respectively. In 2010, his 
OPS 100 dropped to 173 to his expected value. In 
2011-his contract year-the model predicts an 
OPSIOO of 155, yet he hit only 148. Despite two years 
of declining OPS100 values that failed to meet the 
morlel's Pxpectations, the Angels still signed Pujols to 
a 10-year, $240 million contract. His OPS100 has con-
tinued to decline, dropping to 138 in 2012 and 117 in 
2013. This type of post-contract performance leads me 
to the next related research project: whether players 
shirk after getting a new long term contract. • 
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